Inequality and Violence
Silence Begets Violence: A mass media experiment to prevent violence against women in rural Uganda.
With Donald P. Green and Anna Wilke.
Preventing violence against women (VAW) requires witnesses to come forward, yet willingness to report is often undermined by social sanctions against those suspected of fabricating allegations. Our theory of the micro-politics of information disclosure in interdependent communities elucidates the role of social norms in preventing VAW. We present experimental evidence from a media campaign attended by over 10,000 Ugandans in 112 rural villages that featured three short videos designed to encourage reporting of VAW in the household. Results indicate a substantial reduction in VAW over a 6-month period following the campaign. Investigation of mechanisms reveals that women in the treatment group became less likely to believe that they would be labeled a gossip if they were to report an incident of VAW, and their personal willingness to speak out increased substantially. We find no evidence of a deeper change in core values pertaining to VAW.
Police and Corruption
How Political Competition Can Increase Corruption: Electoral cycles in police extortion in West Africa.
Several studies have found a positive association between democratization and corruption. Few, however, posit a convincing mechanism. I explain why the relationship between political competition and corruption may be concave. In countries where bureaucracies are poorly insulated from political influence, the introduction of elections increases uncertainty about future leadership. By threatening future income, competitive elections raise the opportunity cost of remaining honest, incentivizing corruption. These dynamics do not exist in autocratic countries, where elections provoke no uncertainty about future leadership, or in consolidated democracies, where civil service legislation protects bureaucrats from political vicissitudes. Examining electoral cycles in over 300,000 bribes paid over a seven-year period by truck-drivers in five West African countries, I show that the average bribe extorted by bureaucrats increases by twenty-three percent in the buildup to competitive elections. Consistent with the idea that political competition only increases extortion when it increases uncertainty, bribes in the post-election period return to the non-electoral average when incumbents win reelection, but remain high when challengers win. I find no evidence that such dynamics exist around elections in autocracies. The findings suggest that democratization can have adverse effects on corruption in the short-term, and highlight the importance of civil service insulation as an anti-corruption policy.
How robust is institutionalized corruption? A field experiment on extortion along West African highways.
Are dramatic policy interventions necessary to disrupt forms of corruption sustained through mutually reinforcing expectations, or can small shocks to uncertainty destabilize corrupt equilibria? I attempt to answer this question by randomly introducing the presence of a highly unexpected foreigner into interactions in which officials typically extort citizens for bribes according to a stable going rate. Specifically, I rode with truck drivers along 1,500km of highways in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Togo and Benin. At some of the 123 checkpoints manned by customs, police and gendarmerie, I openly observed attempts to extort bribes from drivers, at others I hid from sight. In contradiction to the expectations of well-informed experts, I find statistically significant evidence against large treatment effects. The findings suggest established patterns of corrupt behavior can be resilient to small shocks to uncertainty, and that experts may overestimate the effectiveness of novel anti-corruption measures.
Declaring and Diagnosing Research Designs.
With Graeme Blair, Alex Coppock, and Macartan Humphreys.
Revised and resubmitted to APSR.
Researchers need to select high-quality research designs and communicate those designs clearly to readers. Both tasks are difficult. We provide a framework for formally 'declaring' the analytically relevant features of a research design in a demonstrably complete manner, with applications to qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods research. The approach to design declaration we describe requires defining a model of the world (M), an inquiry (I), a data strategy (D), and an answer strategy (A). Declaration of these features in code provides sufficient information for researchers and readers to use Monte Carlo techniques to diagnose properties such as power, bias, correct identification of causal conditions, and other "diagnosands." Ex ante declarations can be used to improve designs and facilitate preregistration, analysis, and reconciliation of intended and actual analyses. Ex post declarations are useful for describing, sharing, reanalyzing, and critiquing existing designs. We provide open-source software, DeclareDesign, to implement the proposed approach.
The Broad Impact of a Narrow Conflict: How Natural Resource Windfalls Shape Policy and Politics.
With Sung Eun Kim and Johannes Urpelainen.
Published in JOP.
Access to natural resources creates a political conflict between the expected economic winners and their environmental opponents, but the effects of such conflict on policy and politics remain unclear. To examine the scope of such effects, we exploit the rapid and unanticipated technological breakthroughs in the “fracking” of shale gas. During the past decade, shale gas production around the Marcellus Shale formation in the Northeastern United States expanded rapidly. Using a quasi-experimental design, we examine how access to shale gas in electoral districts changed the voting record of House Representatives on environmental policy relative to neighboring districts without access. Votes become 15–20 percentage points less likely to be in favor of the environment. The best explanation for this effect is the strong electoral performance of (anti-environmental) Republicans in shale-affected districts. The narrow conflict has a broad impact: access to natural resources puts downward pressure on environmental policy across the board.